Do grain reserves necessarily contribute to prices stability and food security in Sudan? An assessment  by Ahmed, Adam E. et al.
Journal of the Saudi Society of Agricultural Sciences (2012) 11, 143–148King Saud University
Journal of the Saudi Society of Agricultural Sciences
www.ksu.edu.sa
www.sciencedirect.comFULL LENGTH ARTICLEDo grain reserves necessarily contribute to prices stability
and food security in Sudan? An assessmentAdam E. Ahmed a,*, Sawsan M. Abdelsalam b, Khalid H.A. Siddig c,da National Nutrition Policy Chair, College of Applied Medical Sciences, King Saud University, Saudi Arabia
b Strategic Reserve Corporation, Sudan
c Khartoum University, Sudan
d Hohenheim University, GermanyReceived 25 September 2011; accepted 10 March 2012
Available online 17 March 2012*
E
16
El
Pe
htKEYWORDS
Grain reserve;
Food security;
Price stabilization;
Sudan;
Strategic Reserve
CorporationCorresponding author. Tel.
-mail address: Adamelhag20
58-077X ª 2012 King Saud
sevier B.V. All rights reserve
er review under responsibilit
tp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jssas
Production and h: +966 5
02@yah
Universit
d.
y of King
.2012.03.
osting by EAbstract Most governments in Africa implement policies aiming to stabilize the prices of staple
foods, which often include building up grain reserves, besides other trade measures insulating their
domestic market from the world market. The mechanism should ideally work as follows, grains
should be bought and stored from areas, during the surplus seasons (after harvest) so as to assure
fair prices to producers and should be distributed during deﬁcit seasons, in deﬁcit areas besides in
cases of emergencies. However, ideal approaches are not necessarily followed in many developing
countries due to different constraints and situations. The Strategic Reserve Corporation (SRC) is
an institution that is established ten years ago to play such a role in Sudan. This paper tries to assess
the performance of the SRC against the overall goals and to study the related obstacles if any. We
use a sample of 112 respondents from the SRC staff, related and grain farmers as our data source.
Results of the research revealed numerous ﬁnancial and administrative constraints that obstruct
SRC from playing the intended role, which need to be considered so as to contribute to price sta-
bility and food security in Sudan.
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Sudan is a large African country with an area of 1.9 million
square kilometers and considered the third largest strategic
food reservoir in the world (Mohamed, 2011; Ahmed, 2002).
Prior to its secession in 2011, Sudan has around 86 million
hectares of high-yield arable land matched by abundant water
resources. Its share of the Nile river system provides 1085
billion cubic meters of water annually, while rain-fall reaches
on average 1000 billion cubic millimeters per year, both adding
to seasonal streams, rivers and groundwater catchments (Jack,
1980). The secession of Southern Sudan has deprived the coun-
try of 25% of its total area, 24% of population, over 80% of
144 A.E. Ahmed et al.its oil income, 75% of it vegetation cover and 30% of potential
arable land. In addition, Sudan stands to tolerate at least 25%
of its water resources (Mohamed, 2011).
Sudan has a diverse climatic condition from arid plains to
savannah, forests and tropical south apart from land and water
resources. Sudan has around 40million acres of forests, 134mil-
lion herds of livestock, and its ﬁsheries from the Nile and the
Red Sea waters produce 110,000 tons of ﬁsh per year. It is con-
sidered one of the three countries in the world that can contrib-
ute to the international food security by resources endowment
(Mohamed, 2011). The total cultivable area in the pre-secession
Sudan is estimated at 85million hectares, which is diminished by
no less than 35%after separation.Nonetheless, less than 20%of
this area is utilized in crop production under the major farming
systems in the country, namely (1) irrigated sector, (2) mecha-
nized rain-fed sector and (3) traditional rain-fed sector
(Mohamed, 2011; Ahmed, 2004). The main food crops grown
in the traditional rain-fed sector are sorghum and millet with
sorghum being the staple food for the majority of the people
in the entire country; whilemillet is the staple food in thewestern
states particularly in Darfur. Wheat is also an important staple
food in theNorthern and central states. Grain production in Su-
dan is entirely inﬂuenced by rainfall because it is mainly pro-
duced by traditional rain-fed sector, hence, rainfall
ﬂuctuations are always correlated to supply and price volatilities
and ultimately food unavailability.
The majority of Sudanese population lives in rural areas
and depends on agriculture as a source of food, income and
employment opportunities. The production of sufﬁcient food
does not only represent an important element for food secu-
rity, but also has implications related to population move-
ments such as rural urban migration. Despite the enormous
resources at hand and the importance of the sector to the coun-
try and the surrounding region, Sudan does not produce en-
ough food to feed its population (Mohammed et al., 2008).
Maintaining stocks of grain in the good harvest years to
protect people from famines during the low harvest years has
been found to be important and a common practice through-
out the history. The earliest recorded instance was the biblical
reference to the build-up of stocks by the ancient Egyptians
during seven years of plenty to cover for the prophesied seven
lean years (Mohammed et al., 2008). In modern times, the
maintenance of strategic grain reserves, or food security re-
serves, stemmed after the prolonged drought that hit Sahel
during the early 1970s, has resulted in a series of disasters
throughout the region. The situation was even simultaneously
aggravated by a worldwide cereal shortage which boomed
food prices to record levels. With limited availability and high
prices the donor community was only able to provide limited
amounts of food aid; hence, many people in the region were
exposed to faminesand diseases (FAO, 2009).
The food crises of 1972–1974 and 1983–1985 that occurred
in most parts of Africa showed how vulnerable are the lives
and livelihoods there to droughts, hence, governments conti-
nent-wide revisited their food security policies. Therefore, pro-
viding food relief through the strategic reserve for people
affected by food emergencies has become an increasingly
important food-security instrument for most African govern-
ments over the past two decades (Asfawand and Sirry, 2008).
The Government of Sudan pursued a policy of intervention
in grain markets for the ﬁrst time following the 1984/85drought that hit hard the country. The problem of food inse-
curity was magniﬁed by acute shortage of production and
inadequate infrastructure and transportation facilities. Conse-
quently, the movement of grain stocks from the surplus pro-
duction areas of central and eastern Sudan to the deﬁcit
areas of Darfur and Kordofan, which were hit hard by drought
and armed conﬂicts was limited (Mohammed etal., 2008; Idris,
2004). The Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) continued to
undertake responsibility for the strategic reserve until 1992
when the liberalization policies were introduced. According
to these policies, the free market mechanisms determine the
supply, demand and prices of sorghum with no intervention
from the Government. However, the sharp increase in prices
of 1995/96 due to a record low production of only 2.4 million
tons and the resulting huge food gap prompted the interven-
tion of the Government. The ABS was used again as an instru-
ment for purchasing, storing and distributing sorghum to the
beneﬁciaries (Idris, 2004).
Agricultural production in Sudan is characterized by its
seasonality and vulnerability to natural disasters which reduce
productivity, hence decline the supply and increases in prices.
In addition, political instability and economic sanctions con-
tribute to ﬂuctuation in the supply, exports and imports of
food. During the three consecutive decades of 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s, there have been several episodes of food shortages
in Sudan, which prompted a huge need for establishing the cer-
eal strategic reserve (Mohammed et al., 2008).
The Strategic Reserve Authority (now Strategic Reserve
Corporation (SRC) was established by a presidential decree
on September 20th, 2000 as an autonomous body with a legal
entity that is answerable directly to the Minister of Finance
and National Economy. The main objectives were to: (1) build
cereal reserves and make available the required ﬁnance in col-
laboration with the relevant institutions; (2) make the neces-
sary precautions to bridge food gaps; (3) be responsible for
storage facilities, replacement, distribution of reserves and (4)
manage selling portions of stocks in local markets in cases of
shortages and in export markets in cases of surplus. According
to Mohammed et al. (2008), the speciﬁc mandates of the SRC
include: (1) availing the ﬁnance needed to procure a strategic
reserve of commodities; (2) coordinating with relevant institu-
tions to ensure the availability and procurement of reserves of
staple cereals and take the necessary actions to avoid food def-
icits; (3) determining the volume of reserves; (4) allocating, dis-
tributing and replenishment of reserves according to approved
procedures; (5) selling reserves in the local markets of different
states when there is a shortage of production and exporting the
excess quantities when there is a surplus; and (6) increasing the
storage capacity to absorb the increasing production and to
fulﬁll the requirements of domestic markets.
Based on this background, this paper tries to assess the
overall performance of this institution after 12 years since it
was ﬁrst established in 2000 against the above-mentioned
goals. We investigate the level of satisfaction amongst related
individuals represented by different cereal grain farmers as
well as different related institutions involved in agriculture
and food security in Sudan. In addition, we further enquire
about any obstacles believed to be obstructing the SRC
from playing the intended role in food price stabilization in
Sudan, based on which the paper draws some policy
recommendations.
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For the purpose of this study both primary and secondary data
were collected and used. Primary data were collected using the
structural questionnaire focusing on SRC senior and junior
staff, representatives of the Agricultural Bank of Sudan
(ABS), representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and For-
ests (MOAF), and selected cereal grain farmers. A sample of
135 respondents were formed leading to a ﬁnal number of
112 observations, which comprises 40 SRC staff members, 10
staff members from MAF, 5 staff members from ABS and
57 cereal grain farmers. To assure the representation of the en-
tire cereal farmers’ atmosphere throughout the country in the
sample, farmers from ﬁve major cereal producing states are se-
lected as follows: (1) 26% of the farmers are selected from Sin-
nar state, (2) 23% are selected from White Nile State, (3) 19%
are selected from Blue Nile State, (4) 18% are selected from
Gedarif State, and (5) 14% of the farmers are selected from
North Kordofan State.
In order to have a sample that represents a wide range of
grain producers in Sudan, it is designed to account for grain
producers across different agricultural subsectors in Sudan.
Therefore, 80% of the interviewed farmers are from the mech-
anized rain-fed sectors, 18% from the traditional rainfed sec-
tors and 2% are from the irrigated sector. The sample also
considers differences in the farm size as 17% of the farmers
have a farm size of about 100–500 feddans1, 40% of the farm-
ers have a large farm size of more than 500 feddans, and the
remaining farmers’ farm size is lower than 100 feddans. In
addition, secondary data were collected from different relevant
sources and descriptive statistics and trend analysis were ap-
plied to analyze the primary and secondary data mainly using
SPSS.
3. Results and discussion
The main ﬁndings of the study reveal that only 33% of the
interviewed respondents including staff members of the SRC,
ABS and MAF besides the interviewed grain farmers believe
that the SRC is doing ﬁne and achieving its stated goals. How-
ever, the remaining 67% of the interviewed respondents men-
tioned that SRC has not achieved its objectives and is unable
to narrow down food gaps in time. Moreover, responding to
the questions related to the obstacles constraining the SRC
from playing the intended role and complying to its mandates,
the respondents believe that the following are the major con-
straints: (1) the lack of administrative autonomy; (2) ﬁnancial
dependency and poor ﬁnancial resources; (3) absence of clear
purchasing and reserve building policies; (4) irresponsible
depletion of SRC reserves; (5) insufﬁcient storage facilities
for storing intended reserves; and (6) unfair distribution poli-
cies in connection with politically and socially inﬂuenced distri-
bution mechanisms.
The lack of administrative autonomy is manifested by
SRC’s lack of delegation of power and insufﬁcient information
about the exact amount of production, stocks available and
forecasted prices so that, the timely decisions would be taken
in connection with grain purchases, distribution and replenish-
ment. The ﬁnancial dependency and poor ﬁnancial resources
of the SRC are reﬂected in the late release of budget items from1 1 Feddan = 0.42 Hectares.the MFNE which affects the time of grain purchases, there-
fore, purchases are made in different portions, different pay-
ments and different prices, which do not assure that reserves
are built at lower costs and with less harms to farmers and
suppliers.3.1. Purchasing grain reserves
One of the obstacles is the absence of clear purchasing and re-
serve building policies as the SRC purchasing policies are
mainly planned by the MFNE in addition to the SRC. This
process involves several investigations and administrative steps
including (1) determining the size of the required reserve to be
purchased, which depends on assessing the extent of the exist-
ing food gap; (2) determining the deﬁcit regions; (3) determin-
ing surplus regions and size if any; (4) determining the
purchasing price; and (5) approving the budget by MFNE
depending on the funding possibilities and assigning purchas-
ing mechanisms. By inquiring about the participation of SRC’s
staff in the design of policies and decision making, only 7% of
the interviewed staff members have conﬁrmed their participa-
tion in relation to the SRC purchasing policies.
One of the most important determinants of the successful
grain reserve building that contributes to price stability is the
time of purchases. In response to the study’s question about
the desired time for SRC to intervene and make purchases,
84% of the interviewed farmers agreed that it should be made
right after the harvest (Fig. 1). This is explained by the fact
that farmers are forced to fulﬁll loans taken to pay for the agri-
cultural inputs, which if not paid immediately in cash to lend-
ers, would be taken in kind valued at extremely low and unfair
prices. In this regard however, 88% of the farmers have con-
ﬁrmed that, the SRC purchasing process does not usually take
place in time allowing many brokers and middlemen to enter
the market and purchase the grain harvests from the farmers
at lower prices, which afterward, they resell to the SRC at
higher prices. This leads to a double loss as the SRC purchases
at higher prices and farmers sell at low prices, hence the SRC
can hardly contribute to grain price stabilization (Fig. 1).
Based on the untimely purchasing policies of the SRC, all
our study’s respondents agreed that the SRC purchasing has
negative effects on the producers as the product will be on
the hands of traders at the cost of producers. 92% of the
respondents conﬁrmed that this process forces the producers
to sell their product at extremely low prices, while 78% of
the respondents mentioned that producers are trapped in big
losses and debts and 73% of the respondents thought that this
might get producers out of the agricultural production.
Due to the unclear procurement policy adopted by the SRC
particularly in connection with purchasing the grains from the
local markets during the surplus (harvest) period, the SRC was
found to lose an amount of 180,883 tons of sorghum in 2005.
In this speciﬁc instance, 100,000 tons of sorghum were im-
ported from India to compensate the deﬁcit in the domestic
market in that year (Mohammed et al., 2008).
As shown in Box 1, the imported grain was imported at the
cost of SDG 7 million according to domestic equivalent in the
same year, while a quantity of 180883 tons would have been
purchased at the same cost considering the 2004 price, which
would have generated an additional surplus of 80883 tons for
the country and the SRC.
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Figure 1 Respondents’ assessment of the SRC roles.
Box 1 Local versus imported grain procurement in 2004/05. Iyman (2005).
Targeted Quantity 100,000 tons of sorghum Domestic equivalent
Import price (CIF) 242 US$/ton 55 SDGa/sack
Costs per imported sack Import-related costs: 36 US$/tons 8 SDG/sack
Transport costs 1.64 SDG/sack
Other costs 5 SDG/sack
Final price (SDG/Sack) at SRC stores 69.64 SDG
Total costs (100,000 tons) in SDG 100000 ton · 10 sack · 69.64 SDG = 69640000
Domestic Sorghum price in 2004 385 SDG/ton (38.5 SDG/sack)
Equivalent quantity to be purchased from local market 696,400,0/385= 180883 tons
SRC actual loss 180833 – 100000= 80883
a The SDG is the Sudanese Pound. 1 SDG=US$ 0.37 as of February 26, 2012.
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grains including direct purchase, deferred payment, importing
and collection of debts from agricultural projects. In the direct
purchasing method, the SRC buys cereals directly from theTable 1 SRC purchases of cereals (2001–2007). SRC (various issue
2001 2002 2003
Amounts purchased (1000 tons)
Total production 3305 5219 3738
Direct purchases 40 29 15
Deferred purchases 0 85 109
Imports 100 0 0
Collection of debts 8 14 0
Total amount purchased 148 128 124
In percentage of the total domestic pr
Direct purchases 1.2 0.6 0
Deferred purchases 0.0 1.6 2
Imports 3.0 0.0 0
Debts 0.2 0.3 0
Total purchases 4.5 2.5 3producers. However, as shown in Table 1, this method consti-
tuted less that 2% of the total domestic production during the
period between 2001 and 2007. This could be constrained by
the fact that, the SRC’s direct purchases depend on thes).
2004 2005 2006 2007
5857 3623 5418 6294
56 29 72 127
0 29 210 89
0 100 28 0
0 0 0 0
56 158 310 216
oduction
.4 1.0 0.8 1.3 2.0
.9 0.0 0.8 3.9 1.4
.0 0.0 2.8 0.5 0.0
.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
.3 1.0 4.4 5.7 3.4
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the production surplus at the time.
The SRC always resorts to deferred purchase when there
was surplus in production and default in self-ﬁnancing during
harvest time. Under such circumstances large quantities of
grain will be grabbed by the banks and large traders. Deferred
purchase is performed by credit letters for one year or through
permanent orders from large traders and banks. Table 1 shows
that, deferred purchase represents the major component of the
total amount purchased by the SRC. It represented 88%, 70%
and 64% of the total amount purchased in 2003, 2006 and
2002, respectively. Nonetheless, deferred purchases do not help
or protect small producers because these purchases do not take
place right after harvest, where the prices are very low.
SRC tends to import grains if the domestic production is
low and their grain reserves of the past years are inadequate.
In 2001 and 2005, the SRC imported grains to ﬁll out the
domestic food gaps, which were prominent in several states
and more speciﬁcally dominant in Kordofan and Darfur. In
2003, the production was only 373.8 thousand tons; however,
there were no imports due to the availability of previous years’
reserves. Nevertheless, the importation of 28 thousand tons of
grains in 2006 despite a yearly production amounting to 5418
thousand tons is cited as an example of the absence of appro-
priate purchasing policies at the SRC.
The last purchasing method followed by the SRC is the col-
lection of debts from agricultural projects. These debts were a
sort of ﬁnance provided to national agricultural projects by
MFNE for cleaning the irrigation canals and purchasing agri-
cultural inputs. The SRC takes the responsibility of collecting
these debts in kind on behalf of the MFNE on the one hand,
and to maintain part of its strategic reserve, which is ultimately
paid for by the MFNE. The collection of these debts depends
on the size of production and the purchase price of strategic
reserve, which is usually announced by the government.
Accordingly, the more remunerative the prices are from the
producers’ view point, the higher will be the collection of
debts, but lower the future distribution prices for both SRC
and the ultimate cereal consumers.
3.2. Distribution of reserves
As depicted in Fig. 2, both SRC’s purchase and distribution
show increasing trends for both over time. On average,0
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Figure 2 SRC’s grain purchases and distribution (distribution increased by about 20,000 tons over the period be-
tween 2001 and 2007, while the purchase increased by
16,000 tons during the same period (Fig. 2). In addition to sell-
ing grains in the domestic markets, the SRC distributes certain
amounts at no cost to poor and vulnerable segments of the
population particularly during crises. However, 89% of the
study’s respondents thought that the free of charge distribu-
tion of grains by the SRC could lead it to run out of ﬁnancial
resources, hence, its inability to perform in the long-run.
As the distribution of cereals surpasses their purchases, this
might ultimately lead to reserves’ depletion if not rationally
governed by the situation on the ground in terms of produc-
tion and demand. As shown in Fig. 2, the year 2006 could
be shown as the year when the SRC has irrationally behaved
as production was high, and distribution was low, which could
be considered as a surplus year, however, there were imports of
28 thousand tons of grain.
3.3. SRC storage facilities
It is essential to have grain stores in the producing regions as
well as in the major consumption areas, i.e. storage facilities
have a similar importance in the surplus as in the deﬁcit areas.
There are different methods of grain storage in Sudan with
varying efﬁciencies including above ground and underground
facilities. Both types include traditional and modern storage
facilities. However, large amounts of grain are lost during
post-harvest operations such as threshing, cleaning, storing
and transportation. Evidently, this is due to the poor tradi-
tional harvesting and storage methods as well as the inade-
quate threshing tools. Grain losses in the traditional stores
can reach 50%, they range between 5% and 13% for modern
storage facilities; 6%in the underground pits and only 1% in
silos (Eltay, 2005).
The SRC has long suffered and still so from the insufﬁcient
storage capacities as well as the lack of required standard in
many of its traditional stores. These stores lead to rapid dete-
rioration of the quality of stored grains accompanied by the
high cost of fumigation and other preservation processes. Since
2001, the SRC has been trying to obtain funds for establishing
adequate stores that decrease the storage costs and provide
sufﬁcient capacity. In 2005, the corporation contracted with
Chinese company (EMEC) to build a silo in Rabak city with
a capacity of 100,000 tons at a total cost of US$ 27.4 million.2004 2005 2006 2007
SRC Distribution 
Linear (SRC Distribution )
000 tons), 2001–2007. Source: SRC (2001–2007).
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ing was ﬁnished in 2010. Similar efforts were also allocated to
purchasing and establishing other silos and quality stores in
Kosti Nyala, El Fasher and Elgunaina, which are expected
to signiﬁcantly improve the SRC storage capacity and contrib-
ute to price stability.
The SRC plans to establish a reserve of 600,000 tons of
grain, however, 67% of this study’s respondents see that build-
ing these reserves is beyond the SRC’s ﬁnancial ability since it
lacks the adequate fund for purchasing the amounts as well as
the required storage facilities. The annual total silo costs for
storing such amount are estimated to be SDG 12.5 million
(US$ 5.8 million). That is because the costs besides re-packing
and transportation to deﬁcit area include annually about SDG
950.4 thousand for rent and SDG 3000 thousand for fumiga-
tion costs, which account in total for SDG 12.5 million/year
(US$ 5.8 million).
3.4. Transportation of grains
Transportation of grains is one of the challenges facing the
SRC due to the huge distance between the production surplus
and food deﬁcit areas within the country. The transportation
costs are particularly higher if the grains are to be transported
to conﬂict areas that are associated with food deﬁcits and pop-
ulation vulnerability, but also with uncertainty and risks with
respect to transportation. Similar situations are also associated
with areas affected by ﬂooding excessive rains given the very
limited paved roads.
The SRC distribution of cereals is also inﬂuenced by polit-
ical aspects and social relations as 78% of the SRC staff agreed
that the distribution mechanisms applied by the SRC are extre-
mely affected by political situations and social relations. The
respondents relate that to the nature of communities in Sudan
where policies and social relations are not separated from the
entire decision making process. They assume that tribal and
family linkages inﬂuence the decisions of a majority of the
population in the country not only at the individual level,
but also at institutional levels. Some respondents also thought
that the SRC is constrained from playing a better role by its
complete ﬁnancial dependency on the state represented by
the MFNE.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, attempts have been made to study the state of
food grain reserves in Sudan with particular focus on assessing
the performance of its responsible body, which is the Strategic
Reserve Corporation (SRC). Description of the roles played by
the SRC is presented, with the focus being on its establishment
objectives and their assessment against the performance on the
ground during the last decade. It is clear from the investiga-
tions and ﬁndings that the SRC objectives and mandates are
so wide and contradicting; therefore, it is difﬁcult to achieve
them within the existing budget, administrative structure,
and targeting mechanism. The study recommends that the
SRC should limit its roles to building up the grain reserves
from the surplus generated during the harvest time, which
could be used as a mechanism of fair price assurance forproducers as well as for closing or narrowing the food gaps
during the periods of food shortages and to provide emergency
assistant to vulnerable groups. In order to achieve these goals,
the following should be considered. (1) SRC should be admin-
istratively and ﬁnancially autonomic depending on highly efﬁ-
cient administrative and technical cadres who as well consider
investment opportunities within the overall mandate to im-
prove and sustain its ﬁnancial independency; (2) clear grain
procurement, distribution and reserve replenishment policies
that prevent domestic food market distortions and are inde-
pendent from any political and social inﬂuences need to be
developed; (3) the SRC should focus on establishing an effec-
tive information system for stocks, domestic production, and
domestic and international food prices. It also needs to
strengthen its coordination with other related government
institutions, domestic and international organizations working
on grain purchase, food aid and food security; and (4) the SRC
needs to assure the availability of standard sufﬁcient storage
facilities that consider different kinds of grains and the surplus
and deﬁcit areas in order to reduce transportation costs, assure
grain quality and timely action in purchases and distribution.
The establishment of quality storage facilities in surplus and
deﬁcit areas would also help in avoiding the challenges evolv-
ing from transporting the grain during the rainy or droughty
seasons as well as during conﬂicts.
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